temperature of liquid hydrogen, so that the conception of temperature virtually has no meaning for diamond in this range, was a scientific sensation. Einstein's formula, explaining it in terms of the still not-generally-accepted quantum theory, was only partially successful (this is the formula which assumes a single characteristic frequency). Lindemann in his doctor's thesis on the law of Dulong and Petit showed that it fitted metals adequately but not some of the metalloids, e.g. sulphur. Nernst and he published a paper in which the formula was improved by allowing to an oscillator not merely the energy hv but also h v j2 . This gives a much better fit and also a specific heats of compounds such as KG1 to be calculated from the fre quencies of the 'reststrahlen' which Rubens had observed many years before. The tying together of heat and optics in this way was a striking success, and partly compensates for the arbitrary character of the assump tion. Nor indeed was it quite so arbitrary as it now seems. The quantum theory was still fluid and it was not absurd to suggest, as they did, that hv might apply to the kinetic energy of an oscillator and 2 to the potential energy. Later of course the Debye formula came along and the NernstLindemann one was forgotten. Incidentally, Lindemann accepted the superiority of the former at once.
At the same time he was working on the connexion between the character istic frequency and the melting point of a solid. He first showed, with Magnus, that there was an empirical relation between the two for a number of metals and metaloids, using for the frequencies those deduced from measurements of specific heat made by T. W. Richards. He then proceeded to rationalize this. He supposed that a solid melts when the amplitude of the atoms oscillating about their mean positions is enough to bring them into actual contact with one another. From this follows a relation between the frequency of the oscillation, its energy in terms of the temperature at melting point, and the gaps between the atoms. These last Lindemann tried to find from the dielectric constant using Mossotti's hypothesis. The actual idea of relating melting to the amplitude of oscillation of atoms was not new. It had been suggested by Sutherland* twenty years before, but in those days there was no independent knowledge of characteristic frequencies. It is doubtful if Lindemann knew of Sutherland's work. The new theory worked surpris ingly well, both for compounds whose reststrahlen were known, and for elements whose characteristic frequencies could be found from their specific heats at low temperatures.
It was typical of Lindemann's mind to bring together ideas in this way from different branches of physics in an order-of-magnitude calculation. His mind was extraordinarily lively, and he also had an unusually wide knowledge of physics, including astronomy, and what is now called geo physics. He had a gift for picking out the essentials in a piece of physics, even if sometimes he went too far in ignoring the aspects of secondary importance. He was a most stimulating conversationalist on matters of physics, and one Lindeman Viscount Cherw went away from a session with him feeling that he had rearranged all one's mental furniture and added one or two rather bizarre objects to the room. His versatility is shown by the extraordinary variety of the subjects with which he dealt. Thus while in Berlin he invented, with his brother, a glass transparent to X-rays made of lithium, beryllium and boron, which he patented for use as a window on X-ray tubes. He wrote on the selective photo-electric effect, and found a relation between the corresponding frequency and that of an electron moving in a Kepler orbit round one of the positive ions. He tried to improve the electronic theory of metalic conduction by considering the electrons as forming an elastic solid of high frequency. This gets over the difficulty of the specific heat, which was the great stumbling block of the old theory, it needs, however, some special assump tions to fit the facts. It contains the essential element that the electrons form a degenerate system, though of a somewhat different kind from that later considered by Sommerfeld. He also considered the theory of solids and the forces that must exist between the atoms. In doing so he called attention to the paradox that the breaking stress of all solids is much less than it should be, and considered that breakage must occur between crystals rather than across them. Before and during the First World War he published a few papers on astronomical problems such as the effect of radiation pressure on comets, the number of dark stars, daylight photography of stars, and the period of Cephid variables. A more important paper, written with his father in 1919, was on the use of photo-electric cells in astronomical photo metry. In addition to describing a method for making the cells, this paper contains the first account of the Lindemann fibre electrometer, his chief contribution to experimental technique, though in a form appreciably different from what it eventually took.
In 1923 he contributed two more papers to the Monthly Notices of the R.A.S. In one of these he corrects a very improbable conclusion of Eddington's on atomic physics, in the other puts forward the view, now of course quite untenable, that spiral nebulae are distant dust clouds.
During the First World War, while engaged at Farnborough on aero nautical work, which will be discussed later, he lived at an informal civilian mess kept in a house called Chudleigh. Here he met, among others, G. I. Taylor, W. S. Farren, B. M. Jones, F. W. Aston, E. D. Adrian, and the present author, all later Fellows of the Society. Aston was fresh from the Cavendish, where he had been working on positive rays as J. J. Thomson's personal assistant. They had just produced plates showing two or perhaps three parabolae for neon, and Aston was convinced that they were due to neon having isotopes, the first case of this phenomenon outside the radio active elements for which Soddy had coined the name. Lindemann was mildly sceptical, and anyhow loved an argument, so there were frequent discussions. Lindemann always won on points, but Aston was quite un convinced and came back smiling next evening. Probably Lindemann was more impressed by the arguments than he would admit, for he and Aston
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Biographical Memoirs collaborated in a paper on the possibility of separation of isotopes by varying methods. Lindemann was responsible for the theoretical part and Aston for the description of his experiments, unfinished because of the War, on attempts to separate neon by diffusion in pipe-clay. The paper showed that some degree of separation by differences of vapour pressure must be theo retically possible, though the effect might be very slight. Later, in a second paper, Lindemann considered chemical and vapour-pressure methods in more detail, and came to the conclusion that with zero-point energy the effect would be small. However, Keeson* and van Dijk in 1931 succeeded in obtaining the separation expected on Lindemann's theory by distillation of neon near the triple point, and in 1935 made quite considerable samples of gas separated to a substantial extent. This experiment was also of some importance in confirming the existence of zero-point energy. Another of Lindemann's ideas published during the war tried to account for radioactive decay, with its enormous range of lifetimes, as a probability phenomena depending on the approximate coincidence of a number of particles moving in orbits with a frequency determined by the energy of emission and E = hv. Combining this with the Geiger-Nuttall relation he found that about 80 particles were needed, a reasonable number.
His work on some geophysical problems was much more important. In a paper published at the end of 1919 he criticized some aspects of Chapman s theory of magnetic storms and in particular was able to show that a beam of electrified particles of one sign could not be the cause because such a beam would spread too much under the mutual repulsion of the particles, and charge up the earth too fast, there might, however, be a nearly neutral beam driven by the pressure of light. He then joined Dobson in a paper which marks the start of the modern theory of meteorites, in which by a considera tion of the velocities of these objects and of the heights at which they started and ceased to be luminous, as recorded by various observers, they were able to deduce important consequences about the atmosphere; in particular that the temperature in the region of 100 to 150 kilometres altitude must be round about 300 °K and not 220 °K as had been supposed. Some of the features of this paper are no longer accepted; in particular, the view that a meteorite forms a cap of compressed air in front of it which considerably reduces the rate at which it can be heated is valid only at considerably greater densities than the authors supposed. The problem is still not entirely solved, even with the help of much improved experimental data and radar reflections from the trails, but the existence of a region somewhere in the region of 100 kilo metres up, where the temperature is considerably greater than in the stratosphere, is now generally accepted, f
His electrometer was described in a paper written with Kelly in 1924. Though in essentials it is Kelvin's quadrant electrometer much modified, it is a break-away from the Dolezalek and Compton line of development to 49 very small size and great simplicity. It is still a standard instrument and has many important researches to its credit.
A piece of work that has had a considerable influence on later thought on the mechanism of chemical reactions is contained in a short paper in the Phil. Mag. of November 1920, and an equally short contribution to a Discussion of The Faraday Society in 1922 on the radiation theory of chemical action. An attractive theory had been put forward that the exponential variation with temperature of the rate of chemical reactions, especially monomolecular ones, was to be explained by the absorption of the internal temperature radiation of the substance, which was supposed to provide the activation energy. Lindemann refuted this view, at least in the case of the inversion of sucrose, by pointing out that the rate was not greatly altered by exposing the sucrose to bright sunshine. The wavelength effective could be found from the temperature coefficient of the reaction, assuming it caused in this way. It came out as 1 • 05/x, but the radiation of this wavelength is 5 x 1013 times stronger in sunlight than in the dark at laboratory tempera tures. After disposing of some attempted explanations, he put forward his own view in the discussion. The difficulty in supposing that a molecule broke up merely when it received an extra amount of energy was that the chance of this happening would depend on the frequency of collisions and one would not get the variation with density characteristic of a monomolecular reaction. He got round this by supposing that the molecule needed to be in the excited stage, on the average, for a considerable time, large compared with that needed to set up the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. In such a case the actual rate of setting up the distribution, that is the rate of collision, would not matter within wide limits. Looked at in another way, if the density was large many active molecules would be produced per second, but many also would be destroyed, and the number of active molecules available for action would be a nearly constant fraction of the whole. Except that Lindemann envisaged the break-up as due to the centrifugal force of a rotating molecule, while modern theory regards the essential step as the acquisition of enough vibrational energy, this is essentially the view now held.
He had always been interested in some aspects of mathematics, and towards the end of his life Cherwell published two or three papers on the theory of numbers. In these, by very elementary methods, he reached results on the distribution of primes like those obtained by Hardy and Littlewood by highly sophisticated mathematics. The methods are not rigorous, though in the last paper written in conjunction with F. V. Atkinson they are made rather more formal. I believe that even when advanced methods are used rigor is not always achieved in this difficult field. The first of these papers is a note in Nature of October 1941 written when he must have been much concerned with other very different matters.
I am greatly indebted to Sir William Farren, F.R.S., formerly Director of the Royal Aircraft Establishment, for the following notes on F.A.L.'s work on aerodynamics. Lindemann was one, and in some ways the most remarkable, of the scientists who joined the Royal Aircraft Factory* about the beginning of the First World War. He contributed a summary of his 'Reminiscences of Farnborough' to the booklet produced in 1955 in celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the beginning of the Factory's history at Farnborough. He said he had 'no special knowledge of aircraft, and was posted to a Depart ment to which all sorts of odd questions were referred which did not seem to fit into any special field'. His work was left very much to his own choice and his 'investigations ranged from detecting aircraft by sound, explaining why some cylinders with cast-iron fins cooled better than others, designing and making rate-of-climb meters, sun-proof doping for wings, compasses, automatic pilots, turn indicators, bomb-sights, accelerometers, range-finders for the Navy, a contraption to brush aside balloon cables, to occasional excursions into aerodynamics such as the cause of spinning'.
His work on the spinning of aircraft has attracted wide attention, though some obituary notices have not given an accurate account either of what he did, or of the reasons why it was so remarkable. The published records are incomplete, and unfortunately many of those who collaborated with him have died. However, with the aid of some of my own personal records, and with the help of one or two friends who were at Farnborough then and have survived, I have pieced together what I believe to be a true and fairly full account of his contribution.
This was of two kinds. First, by a simple argument from general principles, he deduced correctly the fundamental mechanics of the spinning aircraft.
In his own words, from the same source, 'anyone watching a spinning plane could see that the rate of turn did not increase on the way down'. The longitudinal axis of the aircraft was not far from vertical, and the rotation was round a vertical axis, so that the main relevant aerodynamic reactions, the normal force on each wing, must be in balance with each other. This force, which is not far different from the 'lift' of the wing, depends mainly on two things, the angle at which the wing meets the air towards which it is moving, and the square of the relative speed. From a simple consideration of the geometry, the effective speeds of the two wings were much the same, but the angle o f'incidence' of one wing, the 'outer' or leading wing, was obviously far less than that of the 'inner' or following wing. There seemed no way of reconciling this approximate analysis with observation, except by recognizing that the normal force on a wing, at a fixed speed relative to the air, does not increase continuously with increase of angle, but for small angles rises nearly linearly, reaches a maximum, and then falls rapidly. The angle at which the force is greatest marks the separation of the flow from the upper surface of the wing, the 'stall', which had already been recognized as the basic feature of 
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His second, and in some ways more remarkable, contribution was by his own experiments in flight, as a pilot, in many of which he was accompanied by an observer.* He explored the methods of entry into and recovery from a spin, which he had deduced as logically right. At the same time, his re markable memory enabled him to record readings of instruments in the aircraft in spite of the disturbing effect of its rotation at a rate of about one turn in three or four seconds. From these readings, together with those obtained by the observer in the aircraft, or in the camera-obscura over which some of the later spins were done, his collaborators were able to calculate the essential elements of the manoeuvre, and to produce a theory which enabled its aerodynamics to be explained in terms of the general knowledge of the aerodynamics of those days.
This advance in our understanding of the kinematics and dynamics of a spin marked a change from the situation where it was regarded as something rather odd and generally dangerous to one in which it took its place as one of the possible manoeuvres of an aircraft (though not one which was of any great value). It was something to be avoided if possible, but one which a fully-trained pilot must be capable of dealing with if it arose as an emer gency, such as, for example, after losing control in a cloud. But a full apprecia tion, both of the problem which it has always presented to those who fly, and above all of the situation which Lindemann faced when he undertook his experiments in flight, can be reached only if the extraordinary geometry of the flight path and attitude of the aircraft are recognized.
A typical spin on a B.E.2e aircraft, which was the type on which Linde mann began his work, had the following characteristics. The path of the centre of gravity was a helix with a vertical axis, with a pitch angle of about 60° to the vertical. The inclination of the body of the aircraft was roughly along a tangent to the helix. The impression produced on the pilot was that the aircraft was nose-down with its axis almost vertical. He had a the ground below, which was rotating at a rate of one turn in 4 seconds. It was, however, very difficult to get an idea of where the axis of rotation was in relation to the aircraft. But the single observation that the apparent direction of the resultant of gravity and the acceleration due to the rotation was almost in the plane normal to the wings (i.e in the same direction as it would be in normal hori zontal flight) made it clear that the axis must be somewhere above the pilot's head, or rather would be intersected by the line of his backbone prolonged. This was not the view generally held.
The misunderstanding was mainly due to the fact that the picture of the ground rotating relative to the aircraft conveyed to the eyes an impression that the centre of rotation was somewhere on or beyond the 'inner'f wing, ^ 2
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which would imply that the wing itself was more or less along a radius of the helix. This, however, would have produced a large centrifugal force in that direction. The observation that the resultant acceleration was in the plane of symmetry almost at right-angles to the wing implied that the aircraft was 'banked'* at almost 90° to the plane containing the tangent to the helix and the radius. This was found to be true of virtually all the spins of which records were made at about this time, the angle of bank lying between about 70° and 90°.
The span of the B.E.2e aircraft was about 40 ft. (wing tip to wing tip). The radius of a typical spin was also 40 ft. The speed of the centre of gravity was about 110 ft./s along the helix, equivalent to a vertical rate of fall of about 95 ft./s, and circumferential speed of about 55 ft./s. The corresponding time for a turn was about 4 | seconds, the normal acceleration along the radius of the helix about 2 • 5 g, and the rate of fall about 430 ft. per turn.
It is difficult to make a diagram which shows these quantities clearly. In demonstrations Lindemann used small models, one of which I now have. The axis of rotation was a square rod twisted into the appropriate helix, on which slid a block on which the model of the aircraft was mounted at the appropriate distance and in a typical attitude.
Some published accounts have placed emphasis on the priority of Lindemann's work on spinning; it is appropriate to record here the available evidence, together with an extract from Lindemann's own summary of his work from the source mentioned above. 'The only merit I can claim in carrying out these experiments is that (unlike the professional pilot, who had usually not got a very good head for figures) I was able to remember the readings of the air-speed indicator, the bubble, the angle of incidence on the two wings (measured by tapes on the struts), the height of the beginning and ending of the spin, the time taken and the number of turns and to write them down in my notebook when I had straightened out the plane again. I am glad of this opportunity to correct some of the absurdly dramatic stories which have appeared about this investigation. ' The most complete statement of the whole investigation into spinning carried out at the R.A.E. in those years is contained in an unpublished report, B.A. 317, by H. Glauert (later F.R.S.) dated May 1919. A shorter report was published in the Reports and Memoranda No 411 of the Ad visory Committee on Aeronautics, dated March 1918, the authors being Lindemann, Glauert, and Harris. Glauert's later report is more detailed, and contains much more experimental information, but the conclusions are essentially the same. It includes a valuable summary of what was then recognized as the history of spinning and recovery from it.
Glauert states that 'it is believed that the method of getting out of a spin was evolved first by Mr H. G. Hawker on a Sopwith aeroplane, but the manoeuvre was not generally known until Major E. W. Goodden carried out some spins on an F.E.8. The report of these experiments (dated August 24th 1916) is contained in Appendix I below. About this period also the spin became a recognized manoeuvre in air fighting, and had a considerable value as a method of losing height rapidly or shaking off an opponent who had gained an advantageous position.
'The first scientific experiments on the behaviour of an aeroplane in a spin were carried out in the following year by Dr F. A. Lindemann on a B.E.2e aeroplane.' Goodden was the Chief Test Pilot of the Royal Aircraft Factory.
In 1916 there was a strong and growing feeling at the Factory amongst the engineers and scientists that it would be a great advantage if they could fly themselves as pilots, partly in order to be able to experience at first hand what flying an aeroplane is like, and so to understand something about it, partly in order to be able to do specific experiments either on the aeroplane itself or on equipment, gadgets, etc. Largely as a result of Lindemann's pressure permission was given for five or six to be chosen to go to the Central Flying School at Netheravon and Upavon. The first three were Lindemann, Keith Lucas and myself. We were followed later by the author of this notice, G. P. Thomson. I know that Lindemann flew the same types of aircraft as I did, namely Farman Longhorns and Shorthorns, Avro 504s and B.E.2cs, because we used to compare notes on them. We returned to Farnborough on the same day. To our great sorrow, Lucas was killed in a collision in flight at Upavon.
Having had the pleasure of living in the same house as Lindemann at Farnborough for some eighteen months, I had come to know him well, but I think the experience of learning to fly in his company was something quite unique. In the first place, it showed me what a great man he was, not that I had any doubt about it. He was six years older than I was in years, but many more in experience, both of the world and of science. But I doubt whether anything about him impressed me quite so much as his complete indifference to the difficulties of arriving at an K.F.C. Station in a bowler hat and carrying an umbrella. Lucas and I were in khaki, and therefore relatively inconspicuous, for which we were thankful. Lindemann was unperturbed, and, to our surprise, so was the R.F.C. Their instructions were to teach us to fly, and presumably did not extend to what particular kind of clothes we wore. Nevertheless, we felt it rather unfair that, purely because of our uniforms, we had to attend parades, and drill like soldiers, whereas Lindemann was naturally excused.
One thing I shall never forget was the way in which Lindemann passed the crude 'medical' test, namely an eye test, which was all that they bothered about in those times. The sight of one of his eyes was so poor that it was hardly an exaggeration to say that from the point of view of a test it was blind. It certainly hindered his flying afterwards, particularly in landing, since his stereoscopic vision was seriously impaired. When he came out from the test, naturally triumphant, I asked him how he had done it. His wonderful 54 memory, mentioned above, was the clue, and he said I took a 50-50 chance , and when I asked what he meant, he explained. 'I went in, and he sat me in the chair, and whilst we were chatting I used my good eye to memorize the letters on the side of the card which I could see. When he started the test, I knew he would either leave it that way round, or turn it over. He turned it over, so I shut my bad eye and read the new side without any difficulty. He then turned it the other way round, and I looked at it with my bad eye and read out the letters from memory. O f course, he might have insisted on which eye I used first, but I had to risk that. ' Lindemann's experiments on spinning were made in June and July 1917 on B.E.2e and F.E.2b aircraft. It is impossible to say how much flying experience he had had by then, and I never asked him. But from my own log-book it appears that I had then done about 80 hours' flying on half a dozen different aircraft. I had greater opportunity to fly than Lindemann had, and more interest in flying for its own sake, so it is probable that he had not done more than about 50 hours. His courage in undertaking systematic spinning, involving continuous spins of anything up to a dozen turns, has been widely recognized, but to anyone who has flown it is, to say the least of it, astonishing that he should have undertaken such an arduous and difficult, not to say dangerous task, after so little experience as a pilot.
Lindemann's conclusion, mentioned earlier, that the mean angle of incidence of the wing must be near the stall, led him to an exciting develop ment of his insight into the whole phenomenon, namely the proof that the spin was merely a special case of the normal 'spiral glide , then commonly practised as a means of losing height, whilst still remaining roughly in the same part of the sky. He concluded that he could start a spin by putting the aircraft into a steeply banked turn, closing the throttle until it was doing a spiral glide, and gradually steepening the flight path and increasing the rate of turn by pulling the control column in and changing the bank to suit. Not only did he do this successfully many times, but he succeeded also in reversing the manoeuvre, that is to say in passing from a spin back into a spiral glide. This required great skill and sensitiveness, together with real familiarity with the aircraft and its controls, and moreover demanded great care owing to the possibility of overstressing the structure of the aircraft.
I am reminded by one of our companions* at 'Chudleigh', where some nine of us lived together for several years at Farnborough, of the occasion when Lindemann was taken skating by F. W. Aston (later F.R.S.), who was one of our company throughout the war. Lindemann needed much per suasion, because he said that he never liked to do anything in public which he did not do well. We went to Fleet Pond, and, supported by Aston, he reached the middle of the pond with some difficulty, to everyone's amuse ment. Once there, however, he proceeded to show how figure-skating should really be done.
He had a similar diffidence about his other accomplishments. Three of us
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[
End of Sir William Furred's .]
Frederick Alexander
L i n d e m a n, Viscount Cherwell
Cherwell's strength as a physicist lay in two things: in his power of reduc ing a problem to its simplest form and in his wide knowledge of physics. His knowledge of mathematics was limited, but what he had he could use. He excelled at the flash of intuition, he was less successful in turning it into a steady flame. His most persistent attempt at an exhaustive study was of the quantum theory in its later form. His 'Quantum theory' 1931, which was followed and preceded by a number of shorter and more popular expositions, was an attempt to expand the idea that one of two conjugate quantities, as position and momentum or time and energy, is meaningless without the other. He thought that the difficulty lay in the wrong things having been chosen as fundamental concepts, we ought to have used charge and action not position and time, but he was not very successful in working this out, and a good deal of the book is just an expansion of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Cherwell was a true physicist in the sense that he demanded an intuitive theory, preferably one that could be visualized. He preferred statistical mechanics to thermodynamics in spite of his training with Nernst. It was natural for him to resent the purely mathematical formalism of orthodox wave mechanics, perhaps even he was right to do so, but he had nothing very effective to put in its place. The fact that he never worked on any one line, except on this impossibly difficult one for which his relative weakness in mathematics disqualified him, long enough to become wholly master of it, has reduced his reputation as a physicist, I think unfairly, but it was the defect of a quality which made him peculiarly well fitted for the two great achievements of his life, the work which he did in the war and after wards as Churchill's scientific adviser, and the building up from almost nothing of the Clarendon school of physics.
As adviser to Churchill he needed a very wide knowledge of physical science, without being too biased towards any particular branch. He needed to be able to express the hub of a problem succinctly, and was all the better for not being too closely conscious of a multitude of less important considera tions. Luckily for him, and for the country, he was the exact reverse of the painstaking researcher who follows out the line of his Ph.D. thesis till it is time to retire forty years later. How far Churchill recognized his special qualifications as a physicist one can only guess; he certainly recognized his powers of expression and of reducing a complicated situation to a few key figures. If the following story is not true in fact, it is so in spirit. When Mr Churchill was forming his 1951 Cabinet these exchanges took place: 
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The Clarendon Laboratory, to which Lindemann succeeded, was a magnificent mausoleum. One of the first physics laboratories ever built in this country it had a curiously ecclesiastical air. His predecessor had filled it with the best optical apparatus of his time. When a new piece arrived it was unpacked, tested by the professor, usually at night, and then put back in its packing case. There were some twenty sets of nicol prisms, but no electricity of any kind. This was the province of Townsend in the other laboratory! When Lindemann was appointed he was almost entirely ignorant not only of the peculiarities of Oxford, but also of the general plan of English univer sities. It says much for his perseverance, his skill in choosing men and his political ability, and perhaps not a little for the broadmindedness of Oxford, that long before he retired, the new Clarendon which he had persuaded the University to build was comparable in importance with any physics department in the country. He did not do this through the normal way of setting up a school based on his own particular line of work and achieving pre-eminence in it. He did indeed try a number of ideas of his own, usually with a co-worker. The most successful of these, the work on meteors, and the electrometer, have been described above. But the researches undertaken were a rather heterogeneous lot with a bias, though not a very strong one, towards the nucleus. There was also a good deal of work on photo-electric cells of high sensitivity, in the construction of which Lindemann enjoyed using his high personal skill as a glassblower. Fortunately for Oxford, fear of the Nazis drove a number of Jewish and other physicists out of Germany in 1933. Lindemann took a prominent part in receiving them and got posts in Oxford for several men of outstanding ability, among them Professor Frank Simon, later Sir Francis Simon, F.R.S. This lead to the establishment of a school of low temperature physics in which Lindemann, with his early training under Nernst, felt a natural sympathy, and which soon became world famous in its field. It did not indeed occupy nearly the whole effort of the laboratory which continued to turn out valuable work of varied kinds, but it provided a centre and set a standard of technical and theoretical excellence which was helpful to all.
A substantial part of Lindemann's time and energy, especially in the earlier part of his time in Oxford, went in attempts to strengthen the position of physics in Oxford financially and administratively. He had a keen, though mordant, wit, and sometimes his letters on University business needed to be toned down by senior members of his staff to whom he showed them, but he was prepared to take advice. He could be severe in the laboratory. He was extremely sensitive to noise, especially when lecturing. On one occasion when a senior research man started singing in a nearby room while he was lecturing, he pressed the bell and told the attendant when he appeared to ask 'the operatic gentleman to give his performance outside the laboratory'. The attendant gave the gentleman concerned a nasty shock by saying: 'The Professor says you must leave the laboratory, sir!' He was hard to persuade of the need of expenditure where laboratory funds were concerned, but very generous with his own money, often helping both research students and staff in cases of sickness or personal trouble. He also gave the laboratory a sum of money to be used as a loan fund to help people over a difficult period, e.g. when studentships are paid in arrears.
The Professor's lectures suffered from a rather poor delivery, which made them difficult to hear at the back of the room. For this reason his under graduate classes were small, but the material was excellent. In rather the same way, I am told, his speeches in the House of Lords seldom sounded as well as they read. All the same, his influence in the Clarendon was by no means limited to the research students and staff. The entry for the final honours school increased in his time from half a dozen to about seventy.
In 1937 he stood as an unofficial Conservative for an Oxford University seat, but was not elected.
One of the most interesting developments of the present age is the way in which science is acquiring political importance, as instance the effect on the United States last year of the Russian satellites. This is partly because of the assumed military importance of some of these discoveries and achievements, but only partly so. Scientific advance has become a matter of prestige, as art and scholarship were for a time in the Renaissance. For reasons which were to a certain extent personal and even accidental, Cherwell made science have more influence during the war than it probably would have had without him, and than it had in any other country. In this way he contributed quite appreciably to its present position.
He had met Churchill at the end of World War I. In 1932 he accompanied him as one of a party which followed the line of Marlborough's famous march from the Netherlands to the Danube. Three years later he joined Churchill in a cruise along the east coast of Spain to Tangier.
By 1934 it was becoming obvious that the defence of Britain from bombing in the event of war was a major problem. Lindemann wrote a letter to The Times urging the importance of research into it. In 1935 an Air Ministry Committee of scientists, the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (C.S.S.A.D.) started to study the problem, but Churchill had no confidence in the Air Ministry's judgement in the matter and wished the Committee transferred to the Committee of Imperial Defence, where also he thought its recommendations would be more influential. He and Lindemann had an interview with Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister, who was sympathetic. When Baldwin became Prime Minister the Committee of Imperial Defence on Air Defence Research was set up with Churchill as a member. He insisted that Lindemann be a member of C.S.S.A.D. which reported to the new committee as well as to the Air Ministry. This arrange ment did not work well and in 1936 the quarrel came to a head, members of the sub-committee resenting Lindemann's action in getting Churchill to support his views on the main committee where they felt that Sir Henry Tizard alone should represent them, and Lindemann had to leave though Churchill stayed on. In 1938, however, at his insistence, Lindemann was given a place on the main committee. It was, of course, this sequence of committees which was responsible among other things for the introduction of radar, then called RDF, which had been suggested by Watson W att in February 1935.
Just before the outbreak of war Churchill, with Lindemann's assistance, wrote to Kingsley Wood, then Secretary for Air, on the possibility of a uranium bomb which had already been discussed in the press. The letter pointed out correctly some of the difficulties of constructing such a bomb, but went too far in decrying its possibility, as it missed the possibility of a reaction with fast neutrons. In this it erred in company with physicists of great renown, some of whom continued in this error for another six years! When war broke out and Mr Churchill became First Lord of the Admi ralty he took Lindemann with him as Personal Assistant, a post which he continued to hold when Churchill became Prime Minister, until he became a formal member of the Government as Paymaster-General at the end of 1942, by which time he had been raised to the peerage with the title of Baron Cher well of Oxford.
As Personal Assistant his primary duty was to brief Mr Churchill on scientific matters. In Churchill's phrasing 'Lindemann could decipher the signals from the experts on the far horizons and explain to me in lucid, homely terms what the issues were'. But this was only part of his duties. Almost from the beginning he was consulted on statistical matters, and when Mr Churchill became Prime Minister (May 1940) Lindemann became head of an organization known as the Prime Minister's Statistical Section. It was staffed mostly by young economists from the Universities. When Lindemann, by then Cherwell, became Paymaster-General, it had also to advise him as a member of the House of Lords, as a Minister, and an attender of meetings of the War Cabinet, and was sometimes known as the Office of the Paymaster-General, but it continued to be primarily the M r Churchill was not by training or taste an arithmetically minded man, and Cherwell's first job was to present the quantities to the Prime Minister in a way he could assimilate. He had to summarize the monstrous mass of statistics thrown up by the administration so that the P.M. could see what was happening and grasp the essence of the big quantitative issues that arose for decision.
This meant charts and lots of them, and an endless stream of little minutes summarizing and analyzing Cabinet papers of all and every kind. There were albums containing charts about the war effort, about bombing, about output of aircraft and munitions, about the size and employment of the shipping fleets, and of the daily gains and losses from them. It was a regular thing for them all to be taken off to Chequers over the week-end and looked at after dinner; they were kept thoroughly up to date. These charts were things of beauty and ingenuity and just the kind of presentation the P.M. could understand.
In much the same way the 'Prof's' briefs reduced large tracts of official prose to manageable dimensions and identified weak points in the argument. He had a genius for summarizing and a splendidly simple unadorned prose style. He took the greatest trouble with anything he wrote, drafting, correct ing, re-drafting and correcting again. He could be guaranteed to halve the length of any draft offered-so one who had excellent opportunities to know, reports-ejecting superfluous words and finding with obvious enjoyment two syllables to do the work of four. This brevity at times meant some sacrifice of accuracy and perhaps undue emphasis on one side of the case. But to members of his staff who had delved deeply in a problem and whose inclination, both as academics and as temporary civil servants, was to tell the whole story, Cherwell's reply was always 'Part d'etre annuyeux c'est tout dire'. Brevity was an essential quality of minutes addressed to so burdened a man as Churchill.
Cherwell sent the P.M. an average of about one minute a day. They ranged over the whole extent of the war effort. A great many of them were briefs for the Prime Minister on proposals coming before the Cabinet, but many threw a spotlight on some relatively minor aspect of the war effort. Few were free from figures. An argument was hardly considered respectable unless backed by statistics. An attempt to establish a prima facie case for action by the P.M. had at least to be illustrated by appropriate orders of magnitude. On a few occasions the Prime Minister followed up directly the minutes by asking Lord Cherwell to submit a draft directive to the Minister concerned. More often, the minutes were sent to the relevant Department with a request for further information or for the Departmental view. Most Departments tended to resent the implied criticism; in many cases they considered that the minute represented an over-simplified reference to a complicated situation and that it had betrayed ignorance of many leading facts. This Nevertheless, even in those cases where the Departmental case was impregnable, it did no harm to the Department to have to explain articu lately its point of view. In other cases, undeniable weaknesses were brought to light.
Later on, in 1941, the Central Statistical Office was established, but unlike the Section which continued till the change of Government in 1945, it was not concerned with the conclusions to be drawn from its statistics, still less did it make recommendations on policy. The Section provided the only complete central survey of the war effort which was available. This was the more useful as some of the service and production Departments were reluctant to produce statistics on any subject-particularly at short noticewhere they could not furnish a figure accurate to the nearest unit. Lord Gherwell's insistence on figures being used, which, if necessary, were only correct to within an order of magnitude, often caused alarm and despondency among those responsible for the activities under survey. His slide-rule became famous, he always carried it, and frequently used it in discussion.
The Section often reached the conclusion that departments were exag gerating the demands likely to be placed upon them and underestimating what could be done with the resources at their disposal. The detection in this way of excessive 'requirements' can often be as important in avoiding waste and maldistribution of resources as the forecasting of a shortage that will cause a bottleneck. The natural desire of departments to be on the safe side provides scope for an outside body able to examine the calculations critically. Sometimes it was necessary to call the P.M .'s attention to impending short ages known as such but on which not enough was being done. At the same time the least harmful method of meeting the shortage was suggested. This was often not what would have resulted from normal interdepartmental negotiations which usually end in a compromise and sometimes in ineffective half measures. On some occasions at least the Prime Minister did make proposals or issue directives based on the more forthright recommendations of Cherwell and his staff. These were always based on quantitative con siderations ; some measures though perfectly valid may produce less effect by orders of magnitude than others and Cherwell was never tired of insisting that a small change in a big thing may often be more effective, and is usually more desirable, than a lot of big changes in a lot of small things.
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In the early stages of the war Cherwell was in strong opposition to the view held by certain groups that the war effort should be developed slowly, but later on when the swing was quite the other way he opposed what he thought to be excessive demands of the armed forces and the kind of austerity known as 'the death by a thousand cuts'.
About one third of the minutes to the P.M. were on scientific matters, but of course it is impossible to draw a sharp line. O f the others about 30 per cent, were mainly concerned with the armed forces, 20 per cent, mainly with shipping, 15 per cent, with food, agriculture and raw materials, about 10 per cent, with post-war problems, and the remaining 25 per cent, with miscellaneous topics ranging widely from the building programme to the shortage of matches, from economic warfare to the supply of doctors, from Russia and India to export policy, rationing, inflation and austerity. These proportions varied of course from time to time. The emphasis on post-war problems naturally increased during the last few years, and the proportion of the minutes dealing with the armed forces tended to decline.
An example of the criticism of accepted views which Cherwell often put forward, sometimes successfully, is his analysis in the summer of 1940 of the size of the German bomber force lined up against us. The official view gave the Germans a vast front line and a still vaster accumulation of bombers in reserve. Consequently the forecasts of the damage we were to sustain were quite hideous. Some instinct or fifth sense assured Cherwell that this was all wrong, and he hammered away at the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Economic Warfare about it for months, using good, bad and indifferent arguments and generating tremendous heat. But he finally won, and the conclusive engagements in the battle came when he confronted the Air Ministry with the inconsistency between the stock of aircraft and the scale of production over the past five years that the Germans were supposed to have had with the corresponding stock and production which we had. He ferretted out that our figures of current stock, past output and recorded wastage showed a 'gap' of (perhaps) 5000 aircraft. There were all sorts of wastage which we did not measure properly (e.g. aircraft sent for repair and never repaired), so that the wastage rates the Intelligence authorities were applying to Germany were far too low. Much of the German reserve was mythical, and even the size of their front-line squadrons was not all it was said to be. It required intense self-confidnce, great persistence, an extremely thick skin, the P.M .'s protection (and eventually the services of a judge) for an amateur to upset the experts on a subject of this kind in the middle of a w ar: but Cherwell had them all-and the conclusion was of high strategic importance ( Second World War, 3, 35-36). Another and perhaps better known example is his analysis of bombing. He was an advocate of bombs with a high charge weight ratio (producing big blast effects), as opposed to the lumps of steel, with no more explosive in them than was required to produce plenty of fragments, which the Air Force were using in the early days. He went to look at the flash photographs taken when the first of the new 4000 lb. bombs were dropped to see what damage they had done. The handful of photographs available showed stretches of open country. Cherwell concluded instantly that bombing must be most inaccurate. He would not be consoled by the accepted explanation that as the flash never went off simultaneously with the bomb burst and the aircraft was after all moving at speed it was not in fact really likely that the photo graph would show the site of the explosion. He insisted that the photographs taken as a whole were a significant indicator of accuracy, and got the Prime Minister to arrange for a member of his staff to go to Bomber Command and make a full analysis of all the night photographs taken in recent months. His emissary returned with a somewhat shattering report which demonstrated fairly conclusively that (in these early days) our bombing was only a third or a quarter as accurate as anybody had realized. The conclusion was highly relevant to the question of research priorities, and led to a quick concentra tion of effort on navigational aids ( Secon World siderable courage was required to insist on the discovery of such an extremely unpleasant truth. After all the truth would have come out in time: a lesser man would have left it to emerge.
Another of Lord Cherwell's contributions to the bomber effort was his insistence on the importance of more efficient bombs. He was a strong critic of the continued use of the general-purpose bomb which was available when the war started, and thought it a false economy to use up the stocks rather than scrap them. As Sir Winston Churchill has recounted in his , Lord Cherwell was responsible for the introduction of the aluminized explosives as a result of a critical examination of the damage ratios claimed by the Ministry of Home Security for German bombs. This highlighted the fact that even at a late stage in the war our own explosives, either in the air or in anti-submarine war, were not as efficient as those of the Germans.
Cherwell did not believe in methods of beam bombing which he thought too vulnerable to countermeasures. He preferred target marking by trained crews using special navigation methods. He became a strong advocate of the device known as H 2S which presented to the bomber's navigator a radar picture of the ground over which he was flying. Such a device required high resolution and given the limitation on the size of the aerial imposed by the size of a bomber is only possible with 'centimetre waves', wavelengths of first 10 and then 3 cm being used.
In quite another field of the war Cherwell noticed that in reports of submarine sinkings the submarine was never sighted in advance but many ships reported escapes from submarines they had seen. He concluded that sighting the attacker was a matter of great importance. The binoculars issued to merchant ships were of indifferent quality because of the shortage, but he discovered an Admiralty store of instruments of the best quality held to meet the requirements of ships not yet built, and was able to arrange for some to be diverted to the merchant service.
In addition to his statistical section Lindemann, as he then was, set up an experimental department, M .D .l, under Major-General Jefferis, first at Portland Place and then, when the house was bombed, at Whitchurch, near Aylesbury. Here he came on Friday afternoons to discuss what was going on and watch practice shoots. These were sometimes quite exciting for the others concerned, as it was difficult to persuade him to take adequate care and he would carry on explaining what he had in mind in exact phraseology while they were distracted by the high-pitched whine of metallic fragments. A good deal of the work was concerned with hollow charge weapons, using the principle of the Monroe jet on which fundamental work was done. He favoured them not only for anti-tank purposes but also for the breach of concrete defence and even against submarines. He strongly supported the use of a 35 lb. anti-submarine hollow charge bomb which was to be released in clusters from aircraft; Lord Cherwell strongly believed that the chances of a hit were much greater than in a single depth charge attack. The statistical data, however, did not convince the Ministry concerned who gave up the weapon after one inconclusive operational use. However, the rather similar weapon known as the Hedgehog, also partly developed at M .D.l but not Cherwell's idea, proved successful and received his full support. Much more widely known was the projector infantry anti-tank or Piat, which was distributed to the forward troops, and which achieved some successes. The original anti-tank 'sticky bomb' was made an effective weapon, but since the invasion of England, for which it was intended as a desperate wea pon of defence at close range, never occurred, it was not used for its original purpose, though it found a place in street fighting for breaking an entrance through brick walls.
Lord Cherwell had a series of struggles with the Ordnance Board and with the W ar Office to get certain M .D .l weapons accepted for service use. He tended perhaps to over-rate the increased probability of inflicting greater damage by some new weapon which required special handling in the stress of battle and to under-rate the damage to morale which could be caused by an accident to our own troops. On the other hand, he encountered from time to time a resistance to new ideas which amply justified belief in the existence o f 'Colonel Blimps'. In one instance-that of a small anti-personnel mine developed at the time when Rommel's first advance in Cyrenaica indicated the deplorable absence of a reliable small mine on the British side -opposition continued to prevent the use of this mine for nearly two years, until the field for its employment had disappeared. The last of the series of objections made related to the quality of the ink used in the marking on the exterior of the case.
Though right in his controversy over the size of the German bomber force, Cherwell was less successful in another point of scientific intelligence, the V weapons. As a result of an air photograph of Peenemunde the view was expressed that Germany was preparing an attack with long-range rockets carrying a bursting charge of the order of 10 tons. This was taken very seriously and plans even proposed for the evacuation of London. Cherwell Frederick Alexander Lindemann, Viscount Cherwell reacted strongly; he maintained that the rockets were merely a cover plan to distract us from pilotless aeroplanes, the V. 1 's or 'doodlebugs' as they were afterwards called. He asserted that a charge of 10 tons was quite impossible and that even with a charge of 1 ton the Peenemunde rocket could not go 100 miles. This last point was of practical importance at the time, since they were expected to be used from stations in Normandy about 100 miles from London. In fact, of course, the rockets, V.2's, existed all right with a charge of 1 ton and a range over 200 miles, as was discovered even before they were actually used against us, by a team under the late W. G. A. Perring of the R.A.E., Farnborough, who reconstructed their design from the debris of one which landed in Sweden. Cherwell was right in denying the large charge, but as sometimes happened with him he was carried away by his argument into an exaggerated and untrue position. Yet it should be mentioned that in the heat of the controversy he insisted that R. V. Jones of Scientific Intelli gence be called, knowing quite well that Jones held the opposite view to his own.
Among the developments which Mr Churchill pressed at Cherwell's suggestion were massed 'U.P. rockets for use as A.A. (the rockets had been developed by Crow before the war), the so-called aerial mines designed to entangle night-fighters and swing bursting charges round to hit them, and proximity fuses. Lindemann, as he then was, was also keen on the fluvial mine of 1940 designed to be floated down the Rhine to destroy barges, but vetoed by the French.
During the early part of the war, Cherwell was not much concerned with the quest for an atomic bomb. In October 1941 Roosevelt suggested that the work of development be jointly conducted by the two countries. By the summer of 1942 the favourable forecast of the M.A.U.D. Report had been confirmed, and at the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt at Hyde Park in June the decision was taken for the U.S.A. to go ahead. Churchill* says that this decision was due to the progress that had been made in Britain.
Cherwell was present at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, and at Washington in 1942. He also took part in the Quebec Conference in 1943, which produced the famous Quebec agreement between Britain, U.S.A. and Canada on the development of atomic energy, and was later dis appointed that not all the results expected from it were achieved. From a second Quebec Conference in 1944 he was sent on to Washington by the Prime Minister to negotiate on the renewal of lease-lend, an assignment which produced some comment at the time but in which he was apparently successful.
During the last year of the war, relatively little was being done to produce new weapons on the Allied side, and Cherwell's limited scientific work was devoted to the study of German V weapons and other new German develop ments such as the hydrogen peroxide schnorkel submarine.
Much the greater part of Cherwell's efforts at that time was spent in serving on the many Cabinet Committees concerned with the approaching post-war problems. He was very keenly aware of the poverty which was bound to descend on the country the moment the war ended and he was anxious that we should take all possible measures to strengthen our financial position and to avoid the unduly rapid accumulation of welfare liabilities, both in this country and abroad. Many grandiose schemes were being put forward at this time for the assumption by the Allies of responsibility of guaranteeing standards of life in many of the countries which had been affected by war. He pointed out that if we advanced our responsibilities beyond those involved in the 'prevention of disease and unrest' as it was called, we should weaken ourselves permanently without having the ability to give lasting strength to others.
After the general election in 1945 he returned to Oxford and resumed his work as professor. The conversion of the Wykeham Chair at Oxford to Theoretical Physics on Townsend's retirement in 1946 was to a considerable extent the result of his efforts.
During the post-war period work was started at the Clarendon aimed at producing controlled thermonuclear reactions, first by J. L. Tuck and somewhat later by P. C. Thonemann. Tuck later went to the U.S.A. and is now head of a group working on this problem at Los Alamos. Thonemann's work was transferred to Harwell in 1951 and was the seed from which 'Zeta' developed.
While the Conservatives were in opposition Cherwell acted regularly as Opposition spokesman on economic matters. He moved an annual motion calling attention to the economic situation. The role of critic suited him, and these were the best of his speeches, ornamented with a pungent wit.
In October 1951 Cherwell returned to office as Paymaster-General with a seat in the Cabinet, and resumed his war-time role of special scientific adviser to M r Churchill, the Prime Minister's Statistical Branch was set up again under him with a particular responsibility for 'the analysis and interpretation for the benefit of the Prime Minister of statistical data'. As Scientific Adviser he dealt largely with military matters and the work was especially important during the first few months when Mr Churchill was Minister of Defence.
While in opposition Cherwell had been a consultant to the Ministry of Supply on atomic energy and a member of the technical committee, and on returning to office was asked by the Prime Minister to assume a general oversight of work in this field. Cherwell indeed considered that the main purpose of his return to office, apart from assisting the Prime Minister generally, was to secure the setting up of some non-Departmental organiza tion which would take over from the Ministry of Supply. Apart from a dislike on principle of a Government Department running an industry, he felt that the Ministry of Supply were slow in producing a bomb, and were not likely to develop nuclear power as fast as he thought desirable. Other reasons for wanting a change were to make it possible to pay higher salaries to the top men than was possible inside the Civil Service and to provide better security. There was a good deal of opposition, and the delay was one of the main reasons why his period of office, which was originally to have been one year only, was extended to two. He was even prepared to have sacrificed, if necessary, his professorship, which he would have had to give up if he were away more than two years, to bring this change about. However, in April 1953 the Prime Minister announced that a Committee under the late Lord Waverley had been set up to examine the problem of transferring responsibility for atomic energy to a non-Departmental organization and stated that the Government had decided in principle that this should be done. It was only when the Government had accepted the Waverley Committee report that Cherwell finally resigned. The Com mittee's White Paper was published on 10 November 1953, a few days after his return to Oxford. He retained his connexion with atomic energy develop ments for some months as unofficial scientific adviser to Sir Winston Churchill, and was a founder member of the Atomic Energy Authority from July 1954 till his death.
Cherwell had strong views on technological education. He favoured the establishment of a Technological University on the lines of M .I.T., but was not successful in convincing the Government that this was the best solution. In fact, however, the large expansion of the Imperial College now going on comes very near to it. Undoubtedly Cherwell's advocacy of the expansion of technological education was a major force in bringing about the big improvements which have now been agreed upon.
He paid a visit to Australia in 1953 on business concerned with the supply of uranium. In the last months of his life he was closely involved in the controversy over the continuation of tests of hydrogen bombs, and the effects of radioactive fall-out. He spoke in the House of Lords in May 1957, in favour of continuing them, urging the importance of having an effective deterrent.
Cherwell would have been an arresting figure in any society. Tall and Lindeman Viscount Che saturnine with a deliberately cynical manner, it seemed somewhat incon gruous that he should have been a vegetarian with distinctly faddy views on food (he would only eat the whites of boiled or poached eggs, though scrambled eggs were acceptable), who never smoked and never drank any thing stronger than coffee, except when Churchill insisted on his taking a measured c.c. of brandy. It was perhaps less surprising to find that he was a good games player, in spite of his bad eye. The first impression that he made was often unfavourable, and indeed he had enemies. This was partly the result of a caustic tongue and a too-keen understanding of the weaknesses of others. Yet he was a success with undergraduates, whose society he liked, and to whom he was charming. A cocktail party, for a man who doesn't drink, must be something of an ordeal yet, though I cannot recall ever having seen him at one, I am told that he quite often went and was a most successful guest from a host's point of view, adding much to the gaiety of the evening. Certainly he was a welcome member of the Christ Church Common Room, where he normally went after dining in his own rooms. In spite of, or perhaps because of, his continental education and semi-continental ancestry he was passionately British in sentiment, and resented the accident by which he had been born in Germany instead of in England. He was admittedly wealthy (he left over £200000) and made no attempt to apologize for the fact. He had no belief in equality, and ages before he could have expected to join it, defended the peerage on the grounds of hereditary talent. He had a limited number of friends, but of these he was very fond. As a young man he attended an early Solvay Conference where he met Maurice Due de Broglie and started a friendship lasting all his life with him and his family.* He much preferred French society to German. Partly this was due to his hatred of orthodoxy and of red tape. He must have given the few devoted Civil Servants, whose job it was to look after him in his anomalous position, a very difficult time, but they seem to have liked it. He played the piano for his own pleasure-mostly Beethoven and Chopin -but was shy of doing so in public though he played well. In his later years he spent a considerable part of each morning reading the newspapers. Photography was a hobby he rode for many years, starting with the early Lumiere colour plates which he developed himself. Then he did more in black and white, but returned to colour with modern films.
People were black or white to him, no greys were allowed. This is not uncommon with women of strong wills but is perhaps more usually a feminine trait, if so it was the only one about him, unless his food fads count as such. In a sense, and in spite of his friends, who were not limited to men, he was a lonely man, but there was no sign that this was at all distasteful to him, rather the reverse. One got the impression of a man detached, un emotional and restrained, enjoying the insight his excellent mind gave him into so many aspects of life. But he was not so unemotional as one might at first have supposed.
* Which has the distinction, unique at present, of providing the Society with two Foreign Members. §g
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Towards his 'master', Sir Winston Churchill, Cherwell had a deep feeling of devotion which showed whenever he spoke of him. He had himself the power of inspiring something similar; those who worked under him, thoug they might on occasion be maddened by his faults, came to view him with admiration and affection, much stronger than the feeling of loyalty which relations in a government department or in a laboratory normally engender. This power of leadership is remarkable in itself but doubly so when held by one so strongly individual as Cherwell. In fact, in spite of his superficial cynicism he was genuinely fond of those who worked for him and rea y interested in helping them. They could always rely on his support in all circumstances. He was a most fascinating companion when the time came to relax, funny, understanding and kind.
Though most of Cherwell's working life was spent as a professor indeed, was not 'Prof' his nickname-he will probably be judged mainly by his influence on affairs in the war and after. Some of his ideas on weapons failed in their purpose, the use of rockets for A.A., for example, but they were reasonable ideas and in consequence found application somewhere. Thus the rockets found their place as weapons for air to ground attack on fighterbombers. It is perhaps fair to say that he was better as a critic than as a creator. His most useful work was in revealing hidden errors and mistaken beliefs, as in the discovery of the inaccuracy of the early bombing. When he got an idea or accepted belief he would sometimes hold it with unreasonable tenacity against the facts, but if he had not had this kind of tenacity he would have been unable to make an impression on the fierce wartime world in which he had to work. It cannot have been very easy, for example, to bring about a cut in the ships going to the Middle East and America by more than a factor of 2 shortly before Alamein and Torch , but if this had not been done there would have been a disastrous shortage in Britain.
In his second term of office Cherwell noticeably mellowed, and was perhaps more influential in consequence. In one economic crisis it is said he was able to get his way though Sir Winston Churchill was on the other side, and it seems now that Cherwell was in the right.
Cherwell's work in the war was severely attacked; no doubt he made mistakes, started or sponsored projects which turned out failures, and was sometimes tactless in his dealings with others as zealous for victory as he was himself. But when all proper weight is given to these considerations one is driven to conclude that on balance the good far outweighed the harm. At a time when Churchill carried the burden of the world, Cherwell was of great assistance to him. This assistance went much beyond help on purely scientific matters, it covered indeed most aspects of the war, as is clear from the examples just given. The work he was asked to do was work which he was peculiarly well fitted for, by doing it he served his master well, and through him, Britain.
Cherwell became a Privy Councillor in 1943, was made a Companion of Honour in 1953 and a Viscount in 1956. In 1956 at the age of 70 he resigned his professorship though he held it under status which made this unnecessary. He continued to live in Christ Church and died there in his sleep on 3 July 1957.
